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Regular Paper
New Certi¯cate Chain Discovery Methods for Trust Establishment
in Ad Hoc Networks and Their Evaluation
Hisashi Mohri,y Ikuya Yasuda,y;☆ Yoshiaki Takatay;☆☆
and Hiroyuki Sekiy
In an ad hoc network, we cannot assume a trusted certi¯cate authority and a centralized
repository that are used in ordinary Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). Hence a PKI system of
the web-of-trust type in which each node can issue certi¯cates to others in a self-organizing
manner has been studied. Although this system is useful for ad hoc networks, it has the
problem that for authentication a node needs to ¯nd a certi¯cate-chain to the destination node.
In this paper, we formally model a web-of-trust-type PKI system, de¯ne the certi¯cate-chain
discovery problem, and propose a new distributed algorithm and its modi¯cation that solve
the problem. Furthermore, we propose a measure of communication cost, and according to the
measure, we compare our algorithm with an existing method by numerical computation for
large-size networks and by simulation on randomly generated unit disk graphs for moderate-
size networks. The simulation results show that the communication cost of the proposed
method is less than 10% of the existing method.
1. Introduction
An ad hoc wireless network is a formed net-
work that can be de-formed on-the-°y with-
out the need for any system administration20).
Unfortunately, these characteristics prevent us
from applying traditional security techniques to
ad hoc networks. In particular, though Public-
Key Infrastructure (PKI)6),7) is one of the most
useful security techniques, ordinary PKI sys-
tems cannot be applied to ad hoc networks22).
PKI is a security infrastructure in which we can
authenticate a public key by using digital cer-
ti¯cates6),7). In public-key cryptosystems, we
have to obtain other users' public keys to se-
curely communicate with those users. In PKI
systems as shown in Fig. 1, we can verify that
pkv is the public key of v by using pku.
One of the problems in adopting ordinary
PKI systems in ad hoc networks is that we can-
not assume a trusted certi¯cate authority (to
manage digital certi¯cates) and a centralized
repository (to store digital certi¯cates securely)
that are used in ordinary PKI systems. More-
over, we cannot assign the tasks of a trusted
certi¯cate authority or a centralized repository
to any node in an ad hoc network. If we did so,
because the node may move out of the network,
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the PKI system could not function. In particu-
lar, malicious nodes could easily attack the net-
work to avoid the PKI system because a trusted
third party that administers the PKI system
in the network is only one node. Some meth-
ods assuming certi¯cate authorities by using
threshold signatures have been proposed21),22).
However, these methods may cause the prob-
lem that some nodes holding a fragment of the
function of the certi¯cate authority are attacked
intensively. Hence, we focus on a web-of-trust-
type PKI system considered in Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP)23) in which each node can is-
sue certi¯cates to others in a self-organizing
manner. Some authors have proposed web-of-
trust-type systems for ad-hoc networks where
each node has a distributed repository instead
of a centralized repository3),8),13),14). However,
these systems su®er from the common problem
that a node must discover a certi¯cate-chain if
the node does not have enough certi¯cates for
key authentication.
A set of certi¯cates for authenticating a
node's public key is called a certi¯cate-chain4).
We call the node that authenticates a public
key the source node, and the node whose pub-
lic key will be veri¯ed by the source node the
destination node (See Section 2 for the de¯-
nitions of source node, destination node, and
certi¯cate-chain). Even if the source node does
not directly sign the public key, the source
node is able to verify a public key by discov-
ering a certi¯cate-chain from the source node
1
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to the destination node because the trust re-
lation represented by certi¯cates is transitive.
First, the source node trusts the nodes whose
public keys are signed by the source node be-
cause the source node can verify the certi¯cates
using her public key. Next, the source node
trusts nodes whose public keys are signed by
the already trusted nodes because the source
node can verify the certi¯cates using the al-
ready trusted nodes' public keys. In ordinary
PKI systems, we can ¯nd such a certi¯cate-
chain from the set of certi¯cates in a trusted
repository. However, it is not trivial to discover
a certi¯cate-chain in distributed repositories.
In this paper, we investigate the certi¯cate-
chain discovery problem in ad hoc networks.
The contributions of this paper are as follows.
² We give a formal model for PKI in ad hoc
networks (section 4.1). A web-of-trust-type
PKI system is de¯ned as a weighted di-
rected graph where an edge represents the
direct trust relation guaranteed by a cer-
ti¯cate between the nodes and the weight
of the edge represents the number of hops
in the lower (physical) layer.
² A new distributed algorithm for solving the
certi¯cate-chain discovery problem is pro-
posed based on the model (section 4.2). We
also propose a modi¯cation of the proposed
method (section 6).
² Performance evaluations of the existing and
proposed methods have been conducted un-
der assumptions on packet/certi¯cate sizes
that are more realistic than the previous
ones (sections 5, 6 and 7). The results have
shown that the communication cost of the
proposed algorithm is less than ten percent
of that of the existing method.
After stating the certi¯cate-chain discovery
problem in section 2, we review related work
in section 3. In section 4, we model a web-of-
trust-type PKI system, show that solving the
problem can be reduced to ¯nding a path be-
tween two nodes in the graph, and propose a
new distributed algorithm for solving the prob-
lem. We divide the certi¯cate-chain discov-
ery into the certi¯cate searching phase and the
certi¯cate collecting phase, and we propose a
search method based on a distributed algorithm
for constructing a spanning tree and a method
for collecting all certi¯cates in the discovered
certi¯cate-chain. The whole algorithm will be
called the basic scheme. Furthermore, we pro-
pose a measure of communication cost, and ac-
Certi¯cate :
pkv is the public key of v.
sku (issuer's signature)
v : A user
pkv : The public key of u
u : The issuer (the signer of the certi¯cate)
sku : The secret key of u (to sign)
pku : The public key of u (to verify)
Fig. 1 A certi¯cate for v issued by u
cording to the measure, we compare our method
with the existing method in section 5. In sec-
tion 6, we propose a modi¯cation scheme of the
basic scheme and compare the communication
cost of these methods. For large-size networks,
we derive formulae that approximately repre-
sent the communication costs of the existing
and proposed methods and numerically evalu-
ate the formulae in section 6. For moderate-size
networks, communication costs are evaluated
by computer simulation on a randomly gener-
ated unit disk graph as a routing graph and a
random Hamilton graph as a trust model in sec-
tion 7. In section 8, we discuss the robustness
of the proposed method. Finally, we conclude
this paper in section 9☆.
2. Problem Statement
A certi¯cate C is a data structure including
a public key, ID of the owner of the public key,
and the signature by a signer. For a certi¯cate
C, the owner of a public key is called the user
of C and its signer is called the issuer of C (See
Fig. 1). For simplicity, we write a certi¯cate of
which issuer and user are u and v respectively
as hu; vi.
We investigate a web-of-trust-type PKI sys-
tem8)»10),13),14) where every node v has a repos-
itory and stores only the certi¯cates of which
v is the issuer or the user (see Fig. 1). Each
node u stores certi¯cates such that u is an is-
suer or a user of the certi¯cates in our PKI
system, and each node does not have a list of
trusted nodes. This enables us to reduce com-
munication cost for obtaining certi¯cates to be
☆ Sections 2, 4, 5, and 6 are partially based on our
previous work18).
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stored in a repository in advance. Moreover,
this method reduces the cost of the certi¯cate
revocation phase. In this method, a certi¯cate
is only held by its issuer and user (the owner
of the public key in the certi¯cate). When the
issuer (or the user) wants to revoke the certi¯-
cate, she only has to send revocation informa-
tion to the user (or the issuer) without heavy
computation and communication (e.g., using a
certi¯cate revocation list). In this paper, we use
\trust" as a trust relation between the issuer
and the user of a certi¯cate. That is, \an is-
suer trusts a user to be honest and to correctly
authenticate the owner of a public key before
signing it15)." By a certi¯cate-chain and the
trust relation in a certi¯cate, a source node can
verify the public key of a destination node even
if the source node does not issue the certi¯cate
in which user is the destination node.
However, there is a new problem of discov-
ering a path of certi¯cates based on the trust
relationship in distributed repositories to verify
whether a public key is correct. We call this
problem the certi¯cate-chain discovery problem
in ad hoc networks (De¯nition 1). Assume
that a node u wants to communicate with an-
other node v. If u does not directly trust v, u
has to ¯nd a certi¯cate-chain from u to v. A
certi¯cate-chain from u to v is a sequence of cer-
ti¯cates hu0; u1i; hu1; u2i; : : : ; hul¡1; uli (l ¸ 1)
such that u = u0, v = ul, and the user of the
certi¯cate hui¡1; uii is the issuer of the next cer-
ti¯cate hui; ui+1i. u0 can verify the public key
pku1 by the certi¯cate hu0; u1i. Also, u0 can
verify the public key pku2 by using the certi¯-
cate hu1; u2i and the veri¯ed public key pku1 .
By performing this veri¯cation repeatedly, u0
can get the public key pkul . We say u0 and ul
are the source node and the destination node of
the certi¯cate-chain, respectively. The source
node u can verify the public key pku1 based
on a technique of the public-key cryptography
(digital signature) and the trust relation (\u
trusts u1"). Moreover, u can verify the pub-
lic key pkv based on the certi¯cate-chain and
the trust relation \ui trusts ui+1"). If we do
not assume the trust relation, the source node u
has to consider another method to verify a cer-
ti¯cate in which u is neither the issuer nor the
user. If u cannot ¯nd a certi¯cate-chain from u
to v, u cannot verify the public key pkv. There-
fore, the trust relation is necessary to consider
certi¯cate-chain-discovery methods.
De¯nition 1 Certi¯cate-chain discov-
ery problem in ad hoc networks
Assume that we are given a web-of-trust-type
PKI system where every node v has a repository
and stores certi¯cates in which v is the issuer
or the user. Also assume that we are given a
source node and a destination node, then, ¯nd
a certi¯cate-chain from the source node to the
destination node and collect all certi¯cates in
the certi¯cate-chain.
3. Related Work
Some authors have proposed PKI sys-
tems13),14) that limit the issuing of certi¯cates
for simplifying the problem in De¯nition 1.
However, such methods have the problem that
a node cannot always issue certi¯cates based on
the trust relation among the nodes.
Kitada et al. proposed a public key manage-
ment scheme for ad hoc networks8)»10). Their
proposed scheme is able to reduce the commu-
nication cost in the certi¯cate revocation phase
more than the method proposed by Capkun et
al.3). Kitada et al. also proposed the Ad hoc
Simultaneous Nodes Search (ASNS) protocol to
resolve the problem stated in De¯nition 1.
ASNS ¯nds a certi¯cate-chain as follows.
² The source node broadcasts a search packet
p to nodes that the source node directly
trusts.
² If a node v receives a packet p, v modi¯es
and sends p as follows.
{ The node v adds its own certi¯cate to
the packet p, rewrites the address of
p to the nodes that v directly trusts,
and broadcasts p to the nodes that v
directly trusts.
{ If v directly trusts the destination
node, v adds its own certi¯cate to p,
rewrites the address of p to the desti-
nation node, and sends p to the desti-
nation node.
{ If v is the destination node of p, v adds
its own certi¯cate to p and sends p to
the source node.
² If a node receives more than one packet sent
by an identical source node, the node pro-
cesses only the ¯rst packet as above and
discards all other packets.
Because each node processes only the ¯rst
packet, the number of packets per search is pro-
portional to the number of certi¯cates.
However, ASNS has the following shortcom-
ings. In distributed networks such as ad hoc
networks, the protocol is completed, not when
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Fig. 2 Relation between routing network and
weighted graph N
the destination node is discovered, but when
all nodes in the network receive the packet.
Thus, ASNS may have a heavy communication
cost because of broadcasting packets with cer-
ti¯cates.
4. Proposed Method
In this section, we formally de¯ne a web-of-
trust-type PKI system to make the certi¯cate-
chain discovery problem clear. Based on this
model, we divide the problem into two phases.
Finally, we propose a new distributed algorithm
to solve the problem.
4.1 Web-of-Trust in Ad Hoc Networks
De¯nition 2 Trust model
A model of a web-of-trust-type PKI in ad hoc
networks is a weighted directed graph N =
(V;E; Á), where
² V is a set of nodes,
² E is a set of directed edges, and
² Á is a weight function that maps each di-
rected edge to a non-negative integer.
A node v in V represents a node in ad-hoc net-
works. An edge u ! v in E represents a cer-
ti¯cate from u to v. The weight Á(hu; vi) of an
edge hu; vi represents the number of hops from
node u to node v (see Fig. 2) ☆. For simplic-
ity, we assume that the set V in a trust model
equals the set of nodes in the corresponding ad
hoc network.
4.2 Basic Scheme
As we described in Section 3, certi¯cates are
added to a search packet in the Kitada method.
Thus, all nodes receive a search packet with a
number of certi¯cates whether or not a node
needs the certi¯cates. In this paper, we divide
the certi¯cate-chain discovery problem into the
☆ Note that an edge hu; vi in a trust model does not
mean that node u can directly communicate with
node v.
certi¯cate searching phase and the certi¯cate
collecting phase, and propose a new algorithm
for each phase.
4.2.1 Certi¯cate Searching Phase
We assume that each node knows only edges
adjacent to the node in N . The problem in
this phase is to ¯nd a certi¯cate-chain from a
given source node to a given destination node.
Note that we need not ¯nd all certi¯cate-chains;
¯nding one certi¯cate-chain is su±cient for au-
thentication.
To solve the problem in the certi¯cate search-
ing phase, we use a distributed algorithm for
constructing a spanning tree where the root
node is the source node. We can use any
distributed algorithm for constructing a span-
ning tree in a directed graph. The communica-
tion complexity of standard algorithms for con-
structing a spanning tree is O(jEj), where jEj
is the number of elements of E11).
Kitada et al. showed that the Kitada method
can ¯nd a certi¯cate-chain in a usual ad-hoc
network with topology change by computer
simulation8). This is because there are some
certi¯cate-chain from a given source node to
a given destination node. Assume that a
given source node u wants to ¯nd a certi¯cate-
chain to a given destination node v. Usually,
there are more than one certi¯cate-chains from
u to v in a trust model. In the certi¯cate
searching phase, we construct a spanning tree
on the trust model. When an intermediate
node in a certi¯cate-chain does not receive a
search packet from u, another certi¯cate-chain
is found by the distributed algorithm construct-
ing a spanning tree. Hence the probability
that the distributed algorithm cannot ¯nd any
certi¯cate-chain from u to v in the trust model
is low.
4.2.2 Certi¯cate Collecting Phase
When the certi¯cate searching phase is com-
pleted, each node knows which node is the par-
ent in the constructed tree. However, no nodes,
including the source node, know about the en-
tire tree and the source node needs to obtain
all certi¯cates in a certi¯cate-chain. We can re-
duce this problem to the problem of collecting
all certi¯cates in a path from the source node to
the destination node in the tree because there
must be such a path in the spanning tree. To
solve the problem in this phase, we propose the
following method.
² The destination node sends a packet to the
parent node.
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² Each intermediate node that received the
packet adds its own certi¯cate to the packet
and sends it to its parent node.
This process is repeated until the packet reaches
the source node. When this process is com-
pleted, the source node obtains all certi¯cates
in a certi¯cate-chain.
5. Evaluation
In this section, we de¯ne the communication
cost, analyze the cost of the basic scheme and
the Kitada method, and compare the cost of
the two methods.
5.1 Preliminaries
5.1.1 De¯nition of the Communication
Cost
In Kitada's work8), communication cost is de-
¯ned as the number of packets. This de¯nition
does not consider the size of a certi¯cate and
the number of certi¯cates in a packet. This
de¯nition is not realistic because a packet that
includes several heavy certi¯cates is counted as
\one packet". Thus, we de¯ne a more realistic
communication cost as follows.
De¯nition 3 The communication cost
Let e be any edge in the directed graph N . We
de¯ne the communication cost as follows.X
edge e
ftotal bit size on e£ Á(e)g:
That is, we de¯ne the communication cost as
the total message bits by taking the size of a
certi¯cate and the number of certi¯cates in the
packet into account.
5.1.2 Cost Tree
To estimate the communication cost of the
two methods, we consider a cost tree. A cost
tree is a balanced tree such that the root node
is a source node, the number of nodes is 2jV j
where jV j is the number of nodes in a trust
model, and the degree of a node ism wherem is
the average number of certi¯cates issued by the
node. This tree represents search packet °ows
from a given source node to all other nodes on
the trust model.
In both of the two methods, a source node u
broadcasts a search packet p to nodes that u di-
rectly trusts in the certi¯cate searching phase.
When a node receives more than one packet
sent by an identical source node u, all the pack-
ets except the ¯rst one are discarded. Even af-
ter a destination node has been found, the other
nodes do not know it and thus the distributed
algorithm for constructing a spanning tree on
the trust model does not halt until all the pack-
ets are discarded. Therefore the total number
of nodes in the cost tree is equal to 2jV j.
Though we assume a cost tree is balanced, the
distributed algorithms in both methods may
not construct a balanced tree because an ad-
hoc network in the real world is asynchronous.
If we assume an unbalanced cost tree instead,
the height of the unbalanced tree is larger
than a balanced tree with the same number of
nodes. Thus, our method outperforms the Ki-
tada method for an unbalanced tree more than
a balanced tree because certi¯cates are attached
to search packets. Therefore we assume a bal-
anced tree as the cost tree so that comparison
of the two methods is not disadvantageous to
the Kitada Method. The number of nodes jV j
and the number of edges jEj (i.e., the number
of certi¯cates) in a trust model can be repre-
sented by using the height k of a cost tree and
the average numberm of the node degree in the
cost tree as follows:
2jV j = m
k ¡ 1
m¡ 1 ;
jEj = m£ jV j:
5.2 Analysis of the Kitada Method
In this subsection, we examine the Kitada
method. Though they analyzed their method8),
it was based on a communication cost that did
not consider the size of a packet. We ¯rst di-
vide the method into two phases and analyze
each of the two phases by using our de¯nition
of communication cost to compare the method
and the proposed method.
We can consider ASNS to be a distributed
algorithm constructing a spanning tree in which
certi¯cates are added to a search packet. The
length of a certi¯cate-chain is the number of
edges from the source node to the destination
node. On the other hand, the height of the
spanning tree must be at least the length of the
chain because the chain is also a path in the
tree, and the height may be longer than the
chain because the distributed algorithm does
not halt even if a chain is discovered. That is,
the following relation holds between the length
and the height:
(the length of a certi¯cate chain in
a spanning tree)
· (the height of the tree):
We assume that the length of a certi¯cate chain
equals the height of the tree, i.e., we estimate
6 IPSJ Journal 1959
the communication cost based on the upper
bound of the length. We also use this assump-
tion in section 5.3.
5.2.1 Certi¯cate Searching Phase
In this phase, the source node broadcasts
a search packet to all nodes that the source
node directly trusts. When a node receives the
packet, the node adds its own certi¯cate to the
packet and broadcasts it to all nodes that the
node directly trusts. A packet is transmitted
until a node receives the same packet twice.
Then, the communication cost in this phase
S1(k) is given by the following equation, where
n is the average number of hops, m is the av-
erage number of degrees of nodes in N , Cert is
the size of a certi¯cate, k is the height of the
constructed spanning tree, and Cert req is the
packet size of a certi¯cate search packet.
S1(k) = n
kX
i=1
fCert(i¡ 1) + Cert reqgmi:
5.2.2 Certi¯cate Collecting Phase
When the destination node receives a packet
with certi¯cates, the node adds its own cer-
ti¯cate to the packet and sends it back to the
source node. The destination node sends back
k certi¯cates to the source node because the
number of certi¯cates in this packet is equal to
the length of a certi¯cate-chain. Therefore, the
cost C1(k) is given by the following equation,
where Cert rpl is the size of a replying packet:
C1(k) = n(k £ Cert+ Cert rpl): (1)
5.3 Analysis of the Basic Scheme
5.3.1 Certi¯cate Searching Phase
In the basic scheme, a source node constructs
a spanning tree using any distributed algo-
rithm, and no certi¯cates are added to a packet.
Therefore, the cost S2(k) is as follows:
S2(k) = n
kX
i=1
Cert req £mi:
5.3.2 Certi¯cate Collecting Phase
When the destination node receives a search
packet, each node in the tree knows which node
is the parent node. The destination node sends
the packet to the parent node, and each in-
termediate node receiving the packet adds its
own certi¯cate and sends it to the parent node.
Thus, the source node receives a packet with
(k ¡ 1) certi¯cates. The cost C2(k) is as fol-
lows:
C2(k) = n
kX
i=1
fCert(i¡ 1) + Cert rplg:
5.4 Comparison between the Two
Methods
5.4.1 Complexity Analysis
We analyze the fraction of the communication
cost of the two methods. The total cost of the
Kitada method is equal to (S1(k) +C1(k)) and
the total cost of the basic scheme is equal to
(S2(k) + C2(k)):
S1(k) + C1(k)
S2(k) + C2(k)
=
O(k ¢ Cert ¢mk+2)
O(mk+1)
= O(k ¢ Cert ¢m):
This tells us that the cost of the Kitada method
is O(k ¢ Cert ¢ m) times the cost of the basic
method.
5.4.2 Numerical Analysis
We also compare the costs by numerical anal-
ysis. We let n = 4, m = 4, and Cert = 2050.
Kitada et al. estimated that the average num-
ber of hops (n) for realistic ad-hoc networks is
at most around four. In the Kitada's paper,
they empirically showed that a trust model is
possibly not connected if m < 4. Hence we
only consider m ¸ 4. Note that since a trust
model is given independently of the trust estab-
lishment algorithm, we should compare the pro-
posed method with the Kitada method with an
identical value for m. Because the ratio of the
cost of the Kitada method to ours is in propor-
tion to m as shown in 5.4.1, m = 4 is the most
advantageous setting for the Kitada method. In
the RSA public key cryptosystems, the size of
a public key is 1024bits and the size of each ci-
pher text (or signature) is more than 1024bits.
Therefore the size of a certi¯cate is more than
2048bits☆. Also, we let Cert req = 100 and
Cert rpl = 100. We assume the size of each
ID as 10bits. These 10bit length IDs can iden-
tify 210 = 1024 nodes, which is large enough
for an ordinary ad-hoc network. Each search
packet Cert req includes a source node, des-
tination node, and pairs of the next node on
the trust model and the next hop on the rout-
ing graph8). The number of pairs of the next
node and the next hop is not a constant and
depends on the number of certi¯cates issued
by each node (the degree of a node in a trust
model). According to Kitada et al.'s estima-
tion that the average degree of nodes to con-
struct a web-of-trust is four8), we assume that
☆ In the real world, a certi¯cate includes ID of the
issuer and owner of a public key, a timestamp of ex-
piration date and so on, and the size of a certi¯cate
may become larger than 2050bits.
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Fig. 4 Basic scheme vs. the Kitada method
(collecting cost)
the average number of pairs of the next node
and the next hop in a search packet is four.
Therefore, the average size of a search packet is
10 + 10 + 4 £ (10 + 10) = 100. On the other
hand, each reply packet Cert rpl may be less
than 100bits. However, our method outper-
forms the Kitada method for less than 100bits
more than it does for 100bits because Cert di-
vided by Cert rpl is larger. Therefore, we as-
sume that Cert rpl is also 100bits so that the
comparison of the two methods is not disadvan-
tageous to the Kitada Method.
Fig. 3 shows the costs of the searching phase.
The cost of the basic scheme is lower than the
cost of the Kitada method. This is because the
searching phase in the basic scheme broadcasts
search packets without adding certi¯cates. In
Fig. 4, we show the graph of the cost of the col-
lecting phase. In the collecting phase of the Ki-
tada method, the destination node sends pack-
ets to the source node. On the other hand, we
have to collect certi¯cates from the destination
node to the source node while sending back the
packet along with the certi¯cate-chain in the
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Fig. 5 Basic scheme vs. the Kitada method (total
cost)
proposed method. Thus, the cost of the ba-
sic scheme is higher than the Kitada method.
Finally, in Fig. 5, we compare the total costs
of the two methods. We can see that the ba-
sic scheme has a lower cost than the Kitada
method.
As a comparison in a more realistic environ-
ment, we also compared the proposed method
and the Kitada method by computer simulation
in section 7.
6. A Modi¯cation Scheme of the Pro-
posed Method
The basic scheme has a disadvantage on the
cost of the collecting phase. To reduce the
cost, we revise the collecting phase of the basic
scheme. In the basic scheme, the source node
obtains all certi¯cates in a certi¯cate-chain by
making each intermediate node add its certi¯-
cate to the replying packet. This scheme re-
quires extra cost because the packet from the
destination node runs through the whole chain,
expanded with the added certi¯cates. To avoid
this overhead, we modify the phase as follows:
² The destination node sends a packet to the
parent node in the certi¯cate-chain.
² Each intermediate node receiving the
packet sends its certi¯cate directly to the
source node and also sends the packet to
the parent node (because no node knows
whether the node itself is on the certi¯cate-
chain to the destination node).
After this modi¯cation, the cost S3(k) of the
certi¯cate searching phase is the same as S2(k),
and the cost C3(k) of the collecting phase is as
follows.
C3(k) = (k ¡ 1)£ n£ (Cert+ Cert rpl):(2)
We also investigated another modi¯cation in
our previous work18). An idea of the other
8 IPSJ Journal 1959
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Fig. 6 Comparison of collecting costs
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Fig. 7 Comparison of total costs
modi¯cation is to use a distributed algorithm
for constructing a shortest path tree such as
the distributed Bellman-Ford algorithm in the
searching phase. However, the upper bound
of the computation time for the distributed
Bellman-Ford algorithm is O(V ¢E)11) and the
one for the standard distributed Dijkstra algo-
rithms is O(V 2)17). Because these costs are
much higher than the costs of algorithms for
spanning trees, the method using a distributed
algorithm for constructing a shortest path tree
require more total cost than our basic scheme
and the Kitada method.
6.1 Numerical Analysis
We compare the above methods by numerical
analysis. We let n = 4, m = 4, Cert = 2050,
and Cert req = Cert rpl = 100.
The cost of the modi¯cation scheme is the
same as the cost of the basic scheme and is
lower than the Kitada method (see Fig. 3).
Fig. 6 shows a graph of the cost of the collect-
ing phase. The modi¯cation method also has
a lower cost than the Kitada method in this
phase.
We compare the total costs of all the above
methods (Fig. 7). From this comparison, we
obtain the following result:
S1(k) + C1(k) (the Kitada method)
> S2(k) + C2(k) (basic scheme)
> S3(k) + C3(k) (modi¯cation scheme).
Note that for (1) and (2), C1(k) · C3(k) if
and only if k ¸ CertCert rpl + 2. We assumed that
Cert = 2050 and Cert rpl = 100 and hence
C1(k) < C3(k) if k > 22. Fig. 6 conforms to
this result. The number of nodes in a network
is already more than 100,000 when k = 9 and
is out of range in Fig. 6.
7. Simulation Results
The numerical analysis in Section 6 showed
that the modi¯cation scheme requires the least
communication cost among the existing and
proposed methods. In this section, we com-
pare the modi¯cation scheme and the Kitada
method more precisely for moderate-size net-
works. We describe the simulation scenarios,
and then we show the average weight in the
trust model and the communication costs of the
two methods. All simulations were performed
with a simulator implemented in Java with a
java library of graph algorithms and optimiza-
tion12).
7.1 Simulation Scenario
We use the following simulation scenarios.
² The number of nodes jV j are 20, 40, 60, 80,
and 100.
² The number of certi¯cate jEj is 4£ jV j.
² The power range of each node is 100.
² The simulation regions are as follows.
{ 100 £ 100 (20 · jV j · 100),
{ 200 £ 200 (20 · jV j · 100),
{ 300 £ 300 (20 · jV j · 100),
{ 400 £ 400 (40 · jV j · 100),
{ 500 £ 500 (60 · jV j · 100),
{ 600 £ 600 (n = 100).
² The routing graph is a unit disc graph. For-
mally, a unit disc graph is the intersection
graph of a set of unit diameter closed disks
in the plane2). Generally, a unit disc graph
is not always connected, which means that
an ad hoc network itself is not formed. Be-
cause we focus on the cost of the two meth-
ods in this section, we used connected unit
disc graphs.
² The trust model is a random Hamilton
graph where each weight of an edge hu; vi
is de¯ned as the shortest path length from
i to j in the unit disc graph (see De¯nition
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Fig. 8 average number of hops in a unit disc graph
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Fig. 9 Average searching cost of the Modi¯cation
scheme
2). Kitada et al. assume a trust model as a
strongly connected graph in simulation sce-
nario, so we use a random Hamilton graph
as an example of such graphs.
² The packet size is 100bits,
² The certi¯cate size is 2050bits.
7.2 Results
7.2.1 Average Number of Hops
We show the average number of hops in a unit
disc graph in Fig. 8. We evaluate the number of
hops by computing the average of the shortest
hops between arbitrary pairs of distinct nodes
in a unit disc graph. When the simulation re-
gion is 500 £ 500, the number of hops nearly
equals four, which matches the number of hops
(m = 4) adopted in the numerical analysis (see
sections 5.4.2 and 6.1).
7.2.2 Comparison of the two methods
We show the communication costs of the
modi¯cation scheme and the Kitada method
by simulations in Fig. 9{13. The modi¯cation
scheme outperforms the Kitada method also in
the simulation results. Below we give detailed
comparisons.
Fig. 9 and 10 show the costs of the search-
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Fig. 10 Average searching cost of the Kitada method
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Fig. 11 Average collecting cost of the Modi¯cation
scheme
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Fig. 12 Average collecting cost of the Kitada method
ing phase. The cost of the modi¯cation scheme
is much lower than the cost of the Kitada
method. In the searching phase of both meth-
ods, a source node constructs a spanning tree.
For simplicity, we use a shortest path tree as
the constructed spanning tree. A constructed
spanning tree is not always a shortest path tree
because of node failure or non-uniform commu-
nication delay. However, the probability of not
constructing a shortest path tree is not high.
Furthermore, whether we use a shortest path
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Fig. 13 Modi¯cation scheme vs. the Kitada method (total cost)
tree or not does not largely a®ect the compar-
ison result of the two methods. Fig. 11 and
12 show the costs of the collection phase. Also
for this phase, we evaluate the costs by using a
shortest path tree. We show the total cost of
the two methods in Fig. 13. We evaluate the
average of the total cost as the sum of the av-
erage searching cost and the average collecting
cost. The simulation results showed that the to-
tal cost of the modi¯cation scheme is less than
10% of the cost of the Kitada method.
8. Security Consideration
In this section, we discuss the robustness of
our method to some known attacks.
Sybil attack In a distributed network with-
out a trusted third party maintaining iden-
tities (ID), a malicious node can have not
only a legitimate ID but also one or more
counterfeit IDs. This attack is called the
Sybil attack5). If a node succeeds in the
Sybil attack, it can improperly raise its
ranking in a reputation system16) by voting
itself using counterfeit IDs, for example.
We consider two variations of the Sybil at-
tack. One is that a malicious node obtains
one or more counterfeit IDs but it has only
one (legitimate) public key (and its corre-
sponding secret key). The other is that a
malicious node obtains both of counterfeit
IDs and public keys. The former case is
easy to treat. Remember that a certi¯cate
binds the ID and the public key of a user.
Hence, if we ¯nd two certi¯cates that bind
di®erent IDs with the same public key, we
know that the user of the public key is ma-
licious. For the latter case, it is generally
impossible to ¯nd out whether or not the
Sybil attack occurs since no node can al-
ways know the physical relation between
a public key and its owner. However, our
PKI system can ¯nd a certi¯cate-chain cor-
rectly as long as every node (including the
attacker of the Sybil attack) faithfully re-
lays packets. The public-key exchange and
the creation of a certi¯cate are usually done
through a side channel (e.g., over an in-
frared channel at the time of a physical en-
counter) before constructing an ad-hoc net-
work3). Therefore the threat of the latter
type of Sybil attack is not serious.
Man-in-the-middle attack When nodes A
and B exchange their public keys pkA and
pkB via a key exchange protocol, a ma-
licious intermediate node M may be able
to give A pkM instead of pkB and give B
pkM instead of pkA. If this attack suc-
ceeds,M can eavesdrop on communications
between A and B. However, in ordinary
PKI systems, a certi¯cate hu; vi is issued if
u trusts v to be honest and has correctly
authenticated v as the owner of its pub-
lic key before signing it15). Moreover, in
web-of-trust-type PKI systems, the source
node can verify the public key of the desti-
nation node by a certi¯cate-chain. There-
fore, web-of-trust-type PKI systems includ-
ing our method can prevent the man-in-the
middle attack.
Also, when the public key exchange be-
tween A and B is completed, this attack
would be foiled with public keys because
the man-in-the-middle would not have the
private key to be able to decrypt messages
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encrypted under A's public key19).
Denial of service attack Denial of service
(DoS) attacks disable routing protocols of
ad-hoc networks, and some authors have in-
vestigated e±cient DoS attacks for ad-hoc
networks1). The main aim of our method
is to get the public key of another node
securely and to prevent the eavesdroppings
of malicious nodes, so the resilience against
DoS attacks is out of the scope of our re-
search. However, we do not assume a per-
fectly reliable routing on ad-hoc networks,
i.e., the proposed method works even if a
routing is unreliable.
No single security system can prevent all
kinds of attacks. Generally, we combine several
security techniques against these attacks. The
main aim of our method is to provide a secure
End-to-End encryption19). In the End-to-End
encryption, the sender of a message and its re-
ceiver should have a shared key or the sender
should have the public key of the receiver. Be-
cause a message is encrypted by a shared key
between the sender and the receiver, even an
intermediate host cannot decrypt it. This en-
cryption scheme does not depend on routing
protocols, so we usually can use some key man-
agement and exchange protocol on routing pro-
tocols. On the other hand, there is Link en-
cryption19) such that the sender and the re-
ceiver and each intermediate node should share
a key. Because every block of a packet, not only
the data part but also the header part, is en-
crypted in the Link encryption, each intermedi-
ate node has to decrypt the packet to check the
header part and encrypt it before sending it to
next node. In the encryption, each intermediate
node can read not only the header part but also
the data part because each intermediate node
has the shared key and can decrypt the packet.
We investigate a secure End-to-End encryption
scheme in ad-hoc networks, where we should
use keys and key management schemes distinct
from those in the Link encryption for security.
Though the Link encryption is also important,
we do not consider it in this paper.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we modeled web-of-trust-type
PKI systems, formally de¯ned the certi¯cate-
chain discovery problem, and proposed a new
distributed algorithm as well as a modi¯cation
for solving the problem. Furthermore, we pro-
posed a measure for the communication cost,
Table 1 The proposed schema vs. the Kitada
method
Method Name Search Collect Total
Basic X X
Modi¯cation X Xy X
Note : \X" means that the cost is lower than the
Kitada method.
y C1(k) > C3(k) if and only if k < CertCert rpl + 2.
and according to the measure, we compared
our algorithms with the Kitada method by nu-
merical analysis. The result of the numerical
analysis is summarized in Table 1. To evalu-
ate the performance of the modi¯cation scheme
in a more realistic environment, we evaluated
it and the Kitada method by simulation. The
simulation results showed that the modi¯cation
scheme requires a lower cost than the Kitada
method.
Unfortunately, existing routing protocols for
ad hoc networks are unable to catch up with
frequent link changes20). These protocols min-
imize the e®ect of the dynamic change of the
topology caused by nodes' mobility by reduc-
ing time, communication, and round complex-
ity. The proposed methods also address node
mobility by reducing such complexities as ex-
isting routing protocols do.
Our future work will include the modeling of
web-of-trust-type PKI systems for ad hoc net-
works more deeply to construct a new trust
model combining the models of Capkun et al.3)
and Kitada et al.8).
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